aircraft overflying Kargil
Nasir has Exposed His Own Lies on Kargil Disaster
Senator Farhatullah Babar
Sept 7: In writing about what he calls ‘the bitter hard
facts’ about Kargil the former ISI chief Lt General (Retd)
Javed Nasir has sought to absolve General Pervez Musharraf ‘my
instructor in the War Wing of the National Defence College’
of the Kargil debacle and blames the executioners of the plan
who ‘faulted in the correct application of the methodology’
of the plan.
history is a ruthless judge of men and matters. Its verdict is
not influenced by evidence like ‘whom I had always rated
as the best’ coming from a bystander of events who also
had ‘the best of relations’ with General Musharraf.
Objective history must depend more on the analysis of hard facts.
Javed Nasir was not an actor in the Kargil misadventure. He was
a bystander who by his own account asked Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif “to make me in charge of logistics in the Kargil
area”. With a fixation about the ability of his instructor
“to carry out the most critical analysis” and himself
wanting to take over the command of logistics of the operation,
Lt General Javed Nasir sees the plan as brilliant but laments
the way it was executed by dwarfs surrounding Musharraf.
ISI chief may like to believe that his becoming in charge of the
logistics would have brought together the ‘brilliant analyst’
and master logistician on the same side at the same time and turned
the tables on the Indians.
there is no ban on the flight of fanciful imagination the former
general may be permitted to indulge in this fancy. The supposition
that the Chief’s responsibility lay only in making “a
brilliant analysis” and thereafter it was not his but his
team’s (identified as Chief of General Staff, Corps Commander,
Director General Military Operations and Commander FCNA) job to
carry it out successfully, is both naive and dangerously faulty.
is ‘brilliant’ about a plan the implementation of
which cannot be guaranteed? And where is the ability of carrying
out “the most critical analysis” when such simple
fact is lost sight of that neither India nor the international
community would permit it?
It is unbelievable that a former Lt General should advance in
such spurious logic. If all generals really think like him it
is all the more reason why issues of war should not be left to
them alone, being too serious.
to the writer “General Musharraf correctly evaluated that
in the event of Pakistan Army occupying Kargil, the Indian Army
would neither be in a position to undertake hot pursuit operations
nor in a position to fight even a defensive battle should the
conflict be enlarged”. It is offensive even to the meanest
intelligence to say that this evaluation was ‘correct’
and that after making this ‘brilliant’ evaluation
the responsibility was no longer that of General Musharraf.
case of a brilliant former general paying compliments to the brilliance
of another general. Isn’t it?
it a correct evaluation? Certainly not. When Kargil was occupied
the Indians launched a massive diplomatic, military and political
offensive forcing Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Kargil.
General Anthony Zinni in his book, Battle Ready, says
about Kargil, “ I met with the Pakistani leaders in Islamabad
on June 24 and 25 and put forth a simple rationale for withdrawing:
If you do not pull back, you are going to bring war and nuclear
annihilation down on your country. That’s going to be very
bad news for every body”.
then goes on to add, “Nobody actually quarreled with this
rationale”. It is strange that the brilliant visionary who
did not quarrel with this rationale in June was unable to anticipate
it early that year.
As a result of Kargil the bluff of nuclear deterrence was called.
Nuclear Pakistan could not deter India from deploying its troops
on the borders and adopting coercive diplomacy. Nuclear Pakistan
had to back down from Kargil.
a result of Kargil also the genuine struggle of the Kashmiri people
was reduced to cross border terrorism as no one talked of liberation
movement but of jihadis sent into Kashmir by Islamabad.
did not internationalize the Kashmir issue. On the other hand
it internationalized the issue of cross border terrorism so much
that even China had to caution Pakistan against exporting jihadi
a result of Kargil, Pakistan was isolated as never before. It
is therefore quite clear that the Kargil led to consequences,
which the ‘brilliant analyst’ who had the ability
to carry out the ‘most critical analysis’ failed to
Sharif claims that he was kept in the dark about the Kargil plan.
Chaudhry Shujaat says that he is prepared to affirm on oath that
Nawaz Sharif was briefed and knew about it. The central issue
is when Kargil was occupied and when Nawaz Sharif was briefed
can be ascertained only through an independent commission of inquiry
and not on the testimony of a personal friend ‘not only
my most favorite chief instructor but also my colleague’.
General Nasir has also taken a swipe at Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for
allegedly agreeing to include in the Simla agreement the condition
that ‘the areas captured across ceasefire line in Kashmir
would neither be vacated nor given back’. He says Bhutto
did this ‘to put the Army in such a humiliating and disgraceful
position that no Chief in future would ever dare to remove the
politically elected government”.
Simla agreement is not a secret document and is publicly available.
One only has to read it to know the lie in the assertion that
there is a clause in it about Kashmir, which requires that areas
captured across the ceasefire line, would neither be vacated nor
given back. The lie is also unwittingly exposed by General Nasir
himself as he says in the same breath, “the Indian army
chief therefore moved his troops to occupy the vacant snow line
features in Kargil”.
question is that if Kargil was already under Indian occupation
why should the Indian army chief move his troops to the ‘vacant
snow line features’ in Kargil. And if Kargil was not in
Indian occupation then and Indian troops moved later to occupy
it, who was to blame; Bhutto for ‘wanting to humiliate the
Army’ or the military leadership whose responsibility it
was to defend Pakistani territory?
Bhutto wanted to heap humiliation on the Army he would have allowed
Sheikh Mujib to proceed with the war crimes which have now come
to public knowledge after the publication of Hamood Commission
he wanted to humiliate the Army he would not have striven to bring
back the tens of thousands of soldiers back from humiliating captivity
in India. In fact in the view of some he went too far in saving
the Army from humiliation by not allowing the court martial of
those responsible for war crimes.
writer also laments that a Kargil like plan was also submitted
to Benazir Bhutto in 1989 but she ‘very curtly disapproved
the plan’. History has proved that her curt disapproval
saved Pakistan from humiliation, which was later to be heaped
on it not by Bhuttos but by the Bonaparts.
writer is a member of the Pakistan Upper House belonging to the
PPP of Benazir Bhutto